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ABSTRACT  Constitutional amendments in federal political systems have to be negotiated between 
national and sub-national actors. While theories of negotiation usually explain the outcome by looking at 
these actors, their preferences and bargaining powers, the theoretical model developed in this article also 
includes their interaction orientation. The article determines a typical sequence of bargaining and arguing 
and identifies favourable conditions for cooperation based on different interaction orientations. The article 
states that actors can reconcile the conflicting logics of intergovernmental or party competition and joint 
decision-making in constitutional politics through a sequence of bargaining and arguing. However, 
constitutional amendments negotiated in this way run the risk of undermining the legitimacy and 
functionality of constitutions. 
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Introduction 
Given the important role of constitutions as the central framework to establish and preserve the 
preconditions for democratic governance, the lack of theoretical knowledge as to why actors in 
established democracies amend their constitutions is unsatisfactory. We know that changes in the 
political environment can cause pressure to adapt political institutions. Such pressure is 
particularly high in federal countries where the complex distribution of powers perpetuates the 
existence of various political and regional interests and ‘gives rise to demands for shifts in the 
allocation of functions from one government to the other’ (Livingston 1956: 11f.; see also Benz & 
Colino in this volume). However, despite a large number of existing case studies, we still have 
little general knowledge about how such pressure is transformed into constitutional amendments. 
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Veto players and negotiation theories attempt to fill this gap by focusing on the actors and 
their power and interests, but empirical evidence casts doubt upon such explanations of 
constitutional amendments. First, there are many more amendments than one would expect to 
result from rational choice reasoning. Second, the willingness of actors to cooperate is not always 
consistent over time, while the text of the amendment proposal, the interrelations between actors 
and the system and its rules remain constant. Third, many constitutional amendments do not 
maximise the net benefit of the veto players in the issues concerned. 
Therefore, this article addresses the following question: Why do veto players usually agree 
to constitutional amendments? The article complements theories on institutions and negotiations 
based on conventional rational choice approaches by including dynamics of interaction 
orientations in the model of explanation. The first section describes the theoretical and empirical 
framework. The second section specifies patterns of negotiation behaviour and argues that varying 
interaction orientation affects the impact of interests and bargaining power, thus causing a 
characteristic sequence of bargaining and arguing in negotiation and varying conditions for 
agreement. While the article is based on comparative empirical research, its focus is on the 
theoretical argument, leaving the empirical material to serve an illustrative function. The third 
section places the proposed explanation into a more general theoretical framework. It argues that 
the sequence of bargaining and arguing allows actors to optimise their overall cost-benefit 
calculation rather than just the issue-related cost-benefit calculation. It can reconcile the 
conflicting logics of intergovernmental or party competition and joint decision-making in 
constitutional politics, but runs the risk of undermining the legitimacy and functionality of the 
constitution. 
 
Theoretical and Methodological Framework 
The most promising approach to explain negotiations and their outcomes is an actor-centred 
institutionalism (Scharpf, 1997). Actors’ decisions are generally considered to be based on rational 
choice because it is a fundamental prerequisite for long-term survival in the system (Rescher, 
1990: 117). Rational actors pursue interests from which they derive objectives and use instruments 
to achieve these objectives. They endeavour to maximise their individual benefit (see, among 
others, North, 1990; Czada & Windhoff-Héritier, 1991; Voigt, 1999). Decision-making is rational 
if actors evaluate a proposal using comprehensive information and evaluation criteria, explicitly 
formulate their preferences, anticipate the positions and behaviour of the other actors involved 
(particularly those with negotiating power), define acceptance zones for the negotiations, and 
derive options for action (Scharpf, 1997). 
A main driving force for day-to-day politics in democracies is competition among parties 
that are committed to vote-seeking and policy-seeking in order to survive in the system. We may 
expect that this also holds true for constitutional negotiations, in particular those concerning the 
allocation of power and resources in a federal system. Unlike many other legal norms, they 
directly affect the decision makers. All this favours a rational cost-benefit calculation. For 
constitutional negotiations, there is another aspect to be taken into account: Amendments of the 
constitution usually have to be passed by majorities larger than day-to-day political decisions 
which  
very often involve opposition parties in parliament (Maddex, 1996; Rasch & Congleton, 2006). 
Broad active approval of the norms shall guarantees the legitimacy of constitutional norms, their 
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long-time acceptance and binding effect. This rationale behind constitutionalism – cooperation in 
favour of the common good – obviously conflicts with the logic of party competition. 
Conventional analyses of negotiations focus mainly on the bargaining powers and 
overlapping policy preferences of the veto players involved, an approach that was reinforced by 
veto player theory (Tsebelis, 2002). Its theoretical plausibility may not outweigh its limited ability 
to predict constitutional amendments. The political practice in federalist systems shows that, 
despite the aforementioned conflict of logic, parties are able to make joint decisions. This is 
especially true for federal countries with a higher number of parliamentary parties participating in 
the political process, which are reported to have the highest rates of constitutional amendments in 
all democracies. On the other hand, federal systems with a predominant party holding 50 per cent 
or more of the parliamentary mandates have the lowest rates of constitutional amendments 
(Lorenz, 2008). 
The willingness to cooperate often changes over the course of time and therefore cannot be 
explained by rather static cost-benefit calculations, actor interrelations or bargaining powers 
provided by institutions. Such observations led authors such as R. Kent Weaver to increase the 
number of ‘independent’ variables. On the basis of his analysis of Canadian constitutional 
negotiations, he asserts that the key parameters that are likely to affect prospects for a 
constitutional amendment fall into roughly three categories: the characteristics of decision makers 
in a particular decision-making arena and their preferences, the number of arenas required for 
approval, and inter-arena relations (Weaver, 2000: 51, 74f.). Other empirical analyses of 
constitutional politics in multi-level and unitary systems also highlight the role of process 
dynamics for explaining constitutional change (Braun, 2009; Schultze, 2000; Schönlau, 2003; 
Elster, 1993; Elster et al. 1998). This is consistent with findings for other policy fields, observing 
the importance of processes, time, and sequences (Cohen et al., 1972; Kingdon, 1995; Pierson, 
2000; Rueschemeyer & Stephens, 1997; Thelen, 1999). Nonetheless, why actors cooperate in 
constitutional amendment politics is still not clear. In particular, scholars disagree on how the 
process determines the outcome. 
In order to contribute to theory-building in this field, the author has conducted process 
tracing studies of constitutional amendments in established democracies. The case selection 
provided for diverse politico-institutional and regional contexts, including unitary and federal 
countries, the presence or absence of a party holding at least 50 per cent of the parliamentary 
mandates, the number of ‘effective’ parties, the frequency of constitutional amendments in the 
given system, the age of the constitution, the constitutional rigidity and the amendment procedure. 
The cases covered different topics of constitutional amendments in two federal and two unitary 
states. All of the reforms analysed affected the territorial organisation of the state and the 
allocation of powers between levels. 
The selected cases included the Canadian Constitution Act, 1999 (Nunavut) of 11 June 1998, 
which introduced political representation of the newly-created territory of Nunavut at the federal 
level; the Greek constitutional revision of 16 April 2001, which, among other issues, altered the 
relation between the nation state and the regions; the  
Irish Twenty-sixth Amendment of the Constitution Act, 2002 of 7 November 2002, which 
explicitly permitted the state to ratify the Treaty of Nice; and the Amendment of the German Basic 
Law of 20 October 1997, which addressed financial self-responsibility of local governments and 
the assignment of tax revenues (for a more detailed account, see Lorenz, 2008). 
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The aim of the study was to detect similar patterns of actor behaviour in the constitutional 
negotiations within dissimilar contexts. These similar patterns of behavior were expected to 
explain the willingness to alter the constitution (cf. Przeworski & Teune, 1970). The approach 
increased the number of variables typically observed in process-tracing analyses by including the 
interaction orientation of the actors. Findings of some other recent analyses focusing on the 
constitutional developments within the European Union encourage the focus on patterns of 
behaviour (Scharpf, 2003: 10f.). Interaction orientation is defined as the guiding philosophy of 
actors which affects their choices and modes of interaction. 
Interaction and conflict studies propose different typologies of philosophies guiding human 
action. While Scharpf distinguishes between solidarity, altruism, hostility, individualism and 
competition (Scharpf, 1997), Maki et al. (1979) distinguish between the motives of altruism, 
cooperation, individualism, competition, aggression, sadomasochism, masochism and martyrdom. 
For this study, the decision was made to distinguish only four ideal types according to two criteria: 
the relations of the benefit calculation (is it to benefit only one or more than one actor?), and the 
actors’ disposition to come to a compromise (considerable or low). 
‘Individualistic’ interaction orientation is defined as a mode that is geared solely to 
maximising self-benefit with little willingness to compromise. This orientation is consistent with 
the rational-choice approach. An interaction orientation is ‘competitive’ when an actor, while 
intending to maximise his or her own benefit, balances it in relation to the benefit of others and 
thus integrates others’ perception into his or her own calculation. Individualist and competitive 
orientations both become manifest in what is often called a bargaining mode of behaviour. 
‘Cooperative’ interaction orientation is defined by willingness to arrive at joint decisions and to at 
least partially abstain from maximising self-benefit. The interaction orientation is ‘altruistic’ if an 
actor is willing to compromise on institutional change for the benefit of other actors. Both 
cooperative and altruistic orientations become manifest in what is often called an arguing mode of 
behaviour or deliberative action (cf. Elster, 1991, 1998). 
Interaction orientations, like preferences (Ganghof 2003: 5), can be inferred by interpreting 
the statements, reasoning and demands of negotiation participants. The analysis is based on 
documents and on information provided by media coverage, surveys and interviews. 
 
Constant and Varying Factors for Agreement During Negotiations 
This section draws theoretical conclusions from the empirical findings of the study on 
constitutional amendment processes, first pointing out the constant effect of power, day-to-day 
routines and vague preferences for negotiations. It then describes how varying interaction 
orientations during negotiations affect the conditions for agreement. 
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The Effect of Power, Day-to-Day Routines and Vague Preferences 
The study confirms that the bargaining powers and policy preferences of actors are very important 
for understanding the negotiation process. Typically, constitutional amendments are proposed by 
the federal or central government or the (federal) government parties in parliament. Other agenda-
setters usually fail to win the majorities necessary to adopt their bills. Even when an arguing mode 
of negotiation is predominant, powerful actors are more successful in persuading others. 
However, the institutional veto structure does not perfectly mirror the real influence of 
actors. Actors who lack formal agenda-setting power may still realise their plans if they convince 
the government of their proposal (the federal government in federal states). This frequently used 
strategy follows routines in day-to-day politics. Here, the government is the formal, not the real 
agenda-setter. Moreover, a major part of the negotiations often takes place outside the institutional 
framework, on an informal basis. This is especially true for federal countries such as Canada and 
Germany where the (federal) governments substantially coordinate and influence the whole reform 
processes, although they never have formal veto capacity but are usually only one of the possible 
agenda-setters. 
Finally, although varying formal procedures for constitutional amendments, especially those 
applied in federal systems, provide for participation of various actors at different levels, the 
negotiations are de facto structured by the interplay between only two (informal, ideational) 
coalitions. While the identity of these actors (or groups) and the level of the main game may 
change during negotiations and may vary between countries, the general dualist structure does not. 
While the first reactions to the amendment proposal are highly diverse and lines of conflict are not 
yet clear, the actors very quickly and voluntarily group themselves into two blocs. This effect is 
illustrated in Figure 1. The self-positioning of the actors with regard to these blocs is clearly 
influenced by routines and the power relations of day-to-day politics. Therefore, such blocs 
emerge in a shorter time in countries where routines of cooperation exist, such as in the 
cooperative federalism of Germany. Because of the self-grouping of actors, multi-level games and 
negotiations with many veto players may actually played much more easily than would be 
expected by looking at the demanding formal institutional procedures for constitutional 
amendments.  
Contrary to approaches which explain collective decisions by the allocation of (fixed and 
measurable) preferences, the study shows that such preferences often do not actually exist or that 
they are formulated too vaguely to establish specific preference orders and to bind the actors in 
constitutional negotiations. The proposals of the agenda-setters often surprise the other actors. 
Therefore, instead of following binding preferences of the collective actors, the representatives of 
these actors only make ad-hoc statements as individuals. 
The explanatory power of veto power and preferences alone is also called into question by 
the fact that constitutional amendments usually benefit mainly the agenda-setter. Two examples 
help illustrate this important empirical finding. 
In 1998, the Federal Parliament and the Senate of Canada adopted a Constitution Act which 
gave the right to self-government to about 25,000 people, most of them 
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Figure 1: Observed course of constitutional negotiations in democracies  
 
Inuit, in a region covering about 20 per cent of the Canadian territory. The negotiators agreed that 
the entire budget of the new territory of Nunavut, including extensive reform costs, would be paid 
by the federal government (and its successors), and that Nunavut would receive administrative and 
political autonomy which would be open to further expansion in the future. The veto players 
received no immediate benefit from this reform. 
In Germany, in 1997, the Social Democratic Party and Alliance ‘90/The Greens, then in 
opposition, agreed to a constitutional amendment which was necessary to substantially decrease 
local trade tax. In doing so, the parties deviated from their own preferences on two issues: They 
allowed the conservative/liberal Federal  
Government to realise a core issue on its agenda (a tax policy to support enterprises), and to limit 
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governments got the right to have a permanent share of the federal value-added tax, but this 
implied neither the authority to decide on this tax nor a constitutional guarantee to actually receive 
a fixed share. There was no benefit for either opposition party from this reform. 
 
Varying Interaction Orientations During Negotiations 
In addition to the observations related to bargaining power and preferences, the study also allows 
for some general conclusions concerning interaction orientations. Obviously, interaction 
orientations of the major actors typically vary in a particular sequence over time, along with 
conditions for cooperation. Three of the four ideal types – individualistic, cooperative and 
competitive interaction orientation – were observed empirically. Figure 1 summarizes the findings. 
The individualistic phase 
During the first negotiation phase, an individualistic interaction orientation is usually predominant 
(for the agenda-setting phase, see also the article by Toubeau in this volume). The agenda-setters’ 
approach to keep the scope of the reform and the text of the proposal as narrow as possible and to 
provide only brief explanations to avoid conflicts (the ‘keep-it-simple’ principle) does not prevent 
other actors from bringing forward many objections regarding the purpose of the proposed 
constitutional amendment, the nature of the underlying objectives, the way these objectives should 
be achieved, and other aspects. Even proposals for minor alterations of the constitution cause 
distributive, ideological and organisational conflicts. Routines of day-to-day politics structure the 
interactions. 
At this stage, as Figure 2 illustrates, actors who have little negotiating power and apparently 
little benefit from the proposed constitutional amendment tend to refuse to cooperate. Actors who 
have little prospect of benefiting and strong negotiating power tend to cooperate only if the 
agenda-setter signals a willingness to consider modifications to the proposal according to their 
demands, if they expect other benefits from promised package deals or if they expect to increase 
their public reputation. Actors who have a greater prospect of benefiting from the proposal  
 
Figure 2: Predicting the willingness to cooperate during the individualistic phase 
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and little negotiating power tend to demonstrate a willingness to cooperate and compromise. 
Actors who anticipate benefiting from the proposed constitutional amendment and who have 
strong negotiating power are less willing to consider compromises and demonstrate much less 
willingness to cooperate. The actors thus follow the rational choice paradigm of risk avoidance and 
limit cooperation to issues that further their own aims. However, they often do not carefully 
anticipate the perspectives or demands of other actors and their statements lack conceptual 
coherence. 
From the empirical evidence one may conclude that, given an individualistic interaction 
orientation, actors agree to cooperate only if they generally support one or some of the agenda-
setters' objectives, if they expect to benefit from a package deal and if the agenda-setter signals a 
willingness to compromise on certain aspects. For example, the Social Democrats, the main 
opposition party in the German case, which also governed some Länder which had to agree to the 
proposed constitutional amendment in the Bundesrat, were interested in compensation by the 
federal government for the tax decrease which could bring a net benefit for the many poor 
communities in ‘their’ Länder. Moreover, they were interested in ‘selling’ their approval to the 
constitutional amendment in exchange for an ‘ecology-tax’ to be introduced by the federal 
government and for concessions in other non-related policy fields such as social policy. Since such 
conditions are not easily met, this phase is usually very long. The mode of interaction is 
bargaining, and the relevant interplay takes place between the agenda-setter and the actor with the 
next greatest power in day-to-day politics. An agreement to cooperate is the signal for entering 
negotiations. 
The cooperative phase 
The decisions of the two main actors to enter into negotiations are usually accompanied by the 
delegation of the power to negotiate to individual delegates. Most of these are either politicians 
with special expertise or administrative experts. The chief delegates demonstrate a considerably 
high degree of issue-specific competency and are well prepared at the meetings. Driven by the 
agenda-setter’s wish to pursue their plans, the actors meet more frequently and in a more 
coordinated manner. These changes generally coincide with a striking modification of interaction 
orientation. At this stage, statements and actions indicate cooperative interaction orientation, 
resulting in a distinct mode of negotiation. Arguing is now prevalent, which confirms observations 
made in policy studies and empirical analyses of other constitutional amendment processes (cf. 
Prittwitz, 2007: 15; Braun, 2009; Weaver, 2000; Joerges & Neyer, 1997). 
At this stage, the agenda-setters’ delegates act conciliatorily, size down the conflicts, 
insistently repeat key arguments and attempt to translate major conflicts into technical or judicial 
ones. In the German case, for example, the government insisted that the trade capital tax hampered 
the economic development in the new federal Länder. It forced the other negotiation participants 
to deal with organisational and financial issues of decreasing this tax by repeatedly setting these 
issues on the agenda of the meetings and providing the other actors with comprehensive 
information. Dealing with these issues prevented the participants from discussing the general 
relevance of the argument. 
The other actors are often positively impressed with the agenda-setter's strong commitment 
to its amendment proposal and ideas, despite the critical objections and  
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vetoes looming. In the course of time, the constant repetition of key arguments by the agenda-
setters seems to break down resistance. In addition, the willingness of the negotiation partners to 
compromise is strengthened by a growing trust in the expertise of the agenda-setter and the feeling 
that they are provided with comprehensive information and are taken seriously as a negotiating 
partner. 
As a result, discussants are willing to consider the positive aspects of the proposal, to take 
into account issues which they had not found particularly relevant before, to reach the best solution 
for the political system irrespective of their own policy preferences and to accept measures as 
useful. They pay attention to arguments and refer to each other’s proposals and statements. 
Frameworks of interpreting reality change and key arguments become weightier. In the Canadian 
case, the Inuit’s wish to have their own territory became understandable through the historical 
background. In the German case, the negotiators accepted the argument that the trade capital tax 
hampered the economic development in the new federal Länder. In the Greek case, the chief 
delegate of the government was able to make the point that the planned revision of the constitution 
was a measure of (positively connoted) Europeanisation and modernisation. Third parties are also 
listened to, and they can influence the discussion if the agenda-setter or their main opponent takes 
up their ideas and suggestions. Thus, the dualist negotiation structure partially breaks down. 
During the meetings delegates demonstrate a more complex understanding of the 
amendment proposal, including the different dimensions of decision making. Giving the Inuit their 
own territory within Canada, for example, was no longer perceived as just doing justice to a 
minority group: The participants also discussed how the proposal would affect various other 
issues, including the political, judicial and financial relationships between the federation and the 
territories (and provinces); the specific rights for minorities (First Nations); the constitutional 
principle of representation; modernisation conflicts; the internal political-administrative reforms in 
the Northwest Territories (NWT) which were already underway; the allocation of finance, goods 
and jobs in the Northwest Territories; and conflicts on land claims in the NWT. 
However, the deliberative turn is not complete in this phase. Although the delegates are 
more inclined to compromise even though the initially proposed deals have not yet been realised 
and the general political climate does not encourage compromise, the cooperative interaction 
orientation does not imply endless openness to other actors’ views. This openness is limited to the 
(countless) details of the constitutional amendment proposal which are not covered by clear 
programmatic positions of the collective actors. Politically salient issues are often addressed in the 
programmes and these positions may not be easily ignored by the delegates. In the Irish case, such 
sensitive points included abortion, tax policy and the military neutrality of the country. In these 
areas where Ireland’s legislation deviated from the policies of the EU, some parties feared that 
further European integration would diminish national sovereignty. In the smaller number of the 
issues where the preferences are formulated clearly, the arguing mode of negotiation is less likely 
to lead to a change of positions of the collective actors represented by their delegates. Thus, 
arguing is practiced not so much in a cognitive sense as in a social sense of listening to each other. 
Since discussing complex issues is demanding and since the agenda-setter’s main interest is 
to realise its specific proposal, the participants primarily evaluate the inside options, that is, the 
best design for the proposed constitutional amendment if it  
were to be adopted. Rather than on completely new ideas, considerations and negotiations focus on 
the initial proposal and the first counter-demands that are discussed in-depth. Accordingly, 
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conflicts are no longer related to the amendment proposal as such, but to the appropriateness of the 
means of achieving the goals of the agenda-setter, to conflicts between different goals, to the 
particular formulation of the amendment bill or to the distribution of resources. As a result, 
perspectives and perceptions narrow down in spite of the aggregated expertise of the negotiation 
participants. In the German case, for example, both the government and the other actors ignored 
the option of creating a completely new local tax (Wertschöpfungsteuer), whose introduction had 
been recommended by many economic experts in the main political advisory councils, although 
this new tax was able to compensate the losses of the local entities from decreasing their trade tax 
without hampering the economy. Obviously, arguing does not guarantee that a theoretically ‘best’ 
solution is considered. 
In a nutshell, given a cooperative interaction orientation, veto players are more inclined to 
compromise and argue. Constitutional norms are often agreed upon, even if they require 
considerable changes of powers and routines of the participants and are therefore very costly 
(Scharpf, 1988, 2003; Closa, 2004). Thus, the cooperative interaction orientation of the delegates 
tends to decrease their collective actor’s benefit from the constitutional amendment (cf. also 
Prittwitz, 2007: 108). The emerging asymmetry of possible benefits provided by the informal 
agreement gives an advantage to the agenda-setter. This contradicts rational choice thinking. 
The competitive phase 
When a (still informal) agreement is reached, the delegates have to communicate the details to the 
collective actors. As a consequence, the infrastructure of the negotiation falls apart. Often the 
dominant interplay shifts to another arena of the political system, particularly in federal systems. 
Moreover, inter-level games may be played informally through side negotiations or re-negotiations 
at a different level or if actors invite participants of previous negotiations at a different level 
through hearings or informal talks in order to improve their own negotiation position. In the 
Canadian case, for example, the opposition parties invited Inuit NGOs and the NWT government 
which had negotiated the amendment with the federal government to present their position 
regarding the constitutional amendment bill in parliament. In the Greek and Irish cases, side 
negotiations took place at the European level. But even when the level is not changed and the 
participating collective actors remain basically the same, that does not necessarily mean that the 
majority of them specifically commit themselves to the interim agreement on a constitutional 
amendment proposal. From this point on, a competitive interaction orientation prevails. 
All players involved now check to see whether the agreement conforms to their own 
objectives and, even more than during the first stage, whether the agreement is appropriate to meet 
their current needs in domestic or international politics. Party-political considerations which do not 
actually concern the substance of the constitutional amendment bill become significant in the 
decision-making and trigger demands for modifications. Thus, parallel developments in domestic 
politics and international relations can influence the amendment process. A catalyst for 
competitive  
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behaviour is that the negotiations now attract the interest of the media and the broader public, often 
for the first time. Media coverage can contribute to increasing conflicts between the political 
actors. 
As a result of the changed interaction orientation, many collective actors reformulate their 
positions and demands regardless of their negotiating power. Previously raised objections are 
reactivated and compromises are called into question. Details of the agreement which had never 
previously played a significant role in the negotiations can provoke major conflicts. In the Greek 
case, for example, the government’s plan to limit the constitutional protection of wooded areas, 
which played only a marginal role in the planned constitutional reform, surprisingly became a 
publicly debated salient issue. Although the number of conflicts is limited during this phase, with 
the distribution of goods and competencies always being an important topic, discussions are 
intense. Negotiations become chaotic and in many cases are likely to collapse. 
While the bargaining mode of interaction indicates that the actors are trying to maximise 
their gains and to correct previous negotiation errors, an analysis of their demands shows that this 
strategy only works to a certain extent. The actors only seem to be concerned with the 
appropriateness of the central paradigm or philosophy guiding the agreement, including the 
distribution of power and resources, while only selectively investigating into the details. Again, 
alternatives to the constitutional amendment are not systematically evaluated. 
The strategy to maximise their own benefits is also hampered by the misperception of the 
motives of other actors. The actors think that they are provided with full and comprehensive 
information about the opportunities and risks of the constitutional amendment, particularly by 
those who are directly affected by the planned constitutional amendment. However, these actors 
have hidden agendas and do not provide full information. Actors who had participated in previous 
negotiations at another level and are now being reactivated by veto players are usually much more 
interested in getting the agreement ratified, rather than just reopening the game for better 
negotiation results. This is also true for actors whose demands were not fully met during the 
cooperative stage of negotiations. Instead of using the opportunity to find allies to reintroduce their 
demands or to support actors who formulate their previous demands, they generally tend to 
support the achieved agreement of the amendment bill as a good solution. The Inuit and the NWT 
government, for example, told the committee members in parliament that the negotiated solution 
was the best compromise even though they were dissatisfied with the reform process. Their aim 
was to guarantee that the reform would be implemented as scheduled. 
In order to reach the final agreement, agenda-setters often accept minor modifications, either 
to the constitutional amendment bill itself or to laws relating to the amendments. They may also 
compromise on other policy issues. Moreover, they regularly show some willingness to renegotiate 
matters with third parties, as long as these actors are not actually interested in extensive 
modifications. Symbolic acceptance of the demands in public statements and declarations without 
legal relevance is also very common at this stage. At the end of this competition over changes to 
the amendment bill, many actors then adopt the bill, declaring that they have achieved the best 
possible solution. Those who vote in favour of the bill often include actors who have neither 
significantly influenced the amendment nor gained from its substance. 
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Thus, competitive interaction orientation implies having distinct conditions for an 
agreement. Actors agree to cooperate if they expect gains from an amendment proposal or from 
side benefits, if the adoption is compatible with tactics in political competition, and if the agenda-
setter is willing to make necessary modifications or to accept demands symbolically. While the 
bargaining mode of interaction is comparable to the individualist interaction orientation, 
competitive orientations go along with different calculations. Small gains are more acceptable 
because the actors evaluate them in relative rather than absolute terms, comparing the gains with 
those of others who had previously negotiated with the agenda-setter. In addition, the 
constitutional amendment proposal is the result of a negotiation path, and it may be costlier to 
change this path and renegotiate the proposal completely than to accept the reached agreement. 
The actors want to close the often protracted negotiation process with an actual decision rather 
than with no decision being made at all. 
These observations show that interests and interaction orientations, along with the general 
distribution of power, explain the prospect of agreement in constitutional negotiations. The 
conditions to reach an agreement vary according to the respective interaction orientation, making 
them an adequate parameter to structure the negotiation processes into different phases. Table 1 
summarises their main characteristics. In addition, the path of negotiations structured by the 
varying interaction orientations  
 
Table 1: Characteristics of negotiation phases 
 Individualistic Phase Cooperative Phase Competitive Phase 
Contacts between actors Sporadic Regular to quasi-permanent Sporadic 
General willingness to 
cooperate None High Limited 
Form of governance - (Elements of competition at the end) 
Negotiations, network, 
hierarchy* Competition 
Conflicts Extensive, including non-related policy matters Extensive to intensive 
Intensive for specific 
points (esp. distribution, 
symbolic matters) 
Attempt to resolve conflicts 
Initiator indicates options for 
compromise with reference to 
non-substantive benefits 
Translation of major conflicts 
into technical, legalistic issues, 
search for compromise 
(importance of third-party 
involvement) 
Small concessions, 
including non-related 
matters and symbolic 
action 
Process-related agreements None or with non-binding power 
Yes, but no predetermination 
of final decision Yes 
Context sensitivity (politics, 
media, elections) Medium Low Medium to high 
* Hierarchy refers to the ministries and administration 
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has a great impact on the negotiation result. When a constitutional amendment is finally adopted, 
the ensuing distribution of gains is substantially shaped by the first proposal of the agenda-setter as 
well as certain agreements made during the competitive stage of negotiations. Compromises 
reached during the cooperative stage of negotiations are usually related to operational and legal 
issues. 
 
Interpreting the Patterns of Negotiation Behaviour 
The absence of clear, stable preferences that are pursued with a high level of commitment, along 
with the typical sequence of constitutional negotiation processes, have strong implications for the 
theoretical understanding of constitutional amendments. This section is an attempt to interpret the 
observed patterns of behaviour and determinants of constitutional outcomes with regard to rational 
choice thinking and to demonstrate that the conclusions, while working for all democracies, are 
particularly relevant for understanding constitutional development in federal systems. Amending 
federal constitutions is not as difficult a task as many authors assume it to be. Indeed, in most 
federal systems amendment initiatives are less likely to result in constitutional stalemate than in 
incoherent constitutional change. 
Following a concept of ‘thin rationality’ (cf. Ferejohn, 1991), one notes that actors who 
behave in the aforementioned ways combine ‘errors’ made in the individualistic phase (lack of 
anticipation and coherency) and ‘errors’ stemming from cooperative social behaviour 
(compromising outside overlapping preference zones) with ‘errors’ provoked by ad-hoc 
competition that is focused on conflicting side issues. The negotiation behaviour favours 
asymmetric gains through cooperation, and constitutional amendments take place much more often 
than expected by conventional constitutionalist, rationalist or veto player theories, especially in 
federal systems with many parties. 
Contrary to concepts of ‘thin rationality’, it appears that adhering to this sequence of 
interaction orientations is useful for the actors in coping with an increasingly complex and 
dynamic environment and making many parallel decisions on possible institutional adaptations 
quickly. Constitutions are complex social constructs, which are affected by various dynamics of 
the political environment, particularly in federal systems with high institutional complexity and a 
large number of actors involved. Therefore, actors in federal systems are constantly forced to 
expect and deal with a wide range of possible changes of the constitutional order. Even 
incremental changes of the constitution often create complex normative, substantial and 
organisational problems. This forces actors to develop features of adaptive behaviour. 
The first point of this study is that being rational implies inventing means to cope with 
problems when they start to become permanent difficulties. Rational actors in complex societies 
have to develop systems of internal functional differentiation which include experts for various 
issues who may be sent to negotiations as individual delegates. Other mechanisms include the 
reduction of social complexity by dualist grouping and the use of cognitive heuristics (looking at 
the general objectives of a proposal) or social heuristics (looking at what others do) as shortcuts in 
making fast and appropriate decisions (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002; Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002). 
The empirically observed means of dealing with problems may fail to solve the problems 
completely and may even create new ones. Functional differentiation, for  
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example, may cause problems of control, coordination and implementation (Scharpf, 1999). In 
fact, the issues at stake in the negotiations on a federal constitution are usually too complex and 
too difficult to explain to politicians without a certain special expertise, while the political options 
and risks of the political game as a whole which is played by the top politicians are too complex 
and too difficult to convey to specialised politicians, who usually tend to consider their own issues 
as the highest priority. This makes it complicated to control whether delegates deviate from the 
preference order of the collective actor and whether their decisions are efficient to realise 
internally agreed political programmes (cf. Lau & Redlawsk, 2001: 951f.; Shepsle & Bonchek, 
1997: 53 ff.).  
However, risking some particular suboptimal decisions with routines may be more 
promising for an actor in the long run than optimising the decision-making processes for each 
particular negotiation. Also, accepting negotiation results which do not offer maximum utility 
gives time and resources to deal with other political issues. This offers an overall benefit. In this 
light, the particular modes of the individualist, cooperative and competitive phases of negotiations 
may be interpreted as various shortcuts of decision-making that together are compatible with the 
rational interest in optimising costs and benefits of internal decision-making in the long run. 
The second point is that the environmental dynamics make it unreasonable for collective 
actors to clearly set many specific fixed preferences because they will not stand the test of time. 
Preference-related conflicts will undoubtedly arise, unintended or unrecognised effects of previous 
decisions will occur, new tools to achieve objectives will have to be considered, or new objections 
to the use of traditional tools for achieving objectives will be raised. Even where fixed preferences 
are set, the complexity of issues makes a clear calculation of costs and benefits impossible 
(Landwehr, 2005) and actors may lack the capacity to calculate costs and benefits properly. 
In this light, a perfect rational choice is not only time- and resource-consuming (thus 
favouring the search for decision-making shortcuts and functional differentiation), it is actually 
nearly impossible to achieve at all. It makes no sense to invest resources in optimising decision-
making which may never be optimised. Instead, it is much more reasonable to develop 
compensation strategies that are designed to maximise gains from cooperation which do not refer 
to the material substance of the negotiation. Actors offer general approval to an amendment bill to 
gain side benefits either from compromises on other policy issues (package deals) offered by the 
agenda-setter, from improving public reputation or from strengthening the agenda-setter’s 
willingness to reciprocate in the future. Making demands that do not refer to the substance of the 
amendment and a certain context sensitivity of decision-making which are typical of the 
individualist and competitive interaction orientations may therefore be suitable to maximise 
overall gains. 
The third point is that the collective actors accept bargaining and arguing as tools for 
preference building and preference readjustment. Agenda-setters are aware that possible mistakes 
and negative externalities of their own decisions can be expensive. They are also aware that other 
actors will raise various objections to their constitutional amendment proposal during negotiations 
and that the audience, if there is one, knows that this is part of the political business. Therefore, it 
makes sense for them to offer proposals for constitutional amendments which are good but not yet 
perfect and to  
focus on minimising possible public criticism only with regard to a few potentially high salient 
issues at the agenda-setting stage. Possible errors or inappropriate solutions in the proposal may be 
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corrected later if uncovered by others. This has the positive side effect that the agenda-setter may 
present such corrections as results of a compromise, thus strengthening the chance for reciprocal 
compromises. 
For the other collective actors, criticising policy proposals is something they do because they 
are expected to. However, arguing can also be beneficial. Deliberating on arguments for and on 
objections against the constitutional amendment proposal provides a chance to outweigh internal 
cognitive and organisational shortcomings in preference formation, and sharing experiences with 
others reduces the individual costs of designing policy concepts. Therefore, all actors have an 
interest in talking with each other and in achieving a certain degree of compromise. 
The fourth point is that being rational implies anticipating future negotiation settings in the 
given politico-institutional context. It is reasonable to do this in a very general form to save costs. 
Nearly all modern democracies have institutionalised systems of checks and balances which 
require a certain degree of inter-party cooperation to govern. Elections change the distribution of 
power among actors, but they rarely change the identity of the actors involved in politics. 
Anticipating to meet powerful negotiation partners again and again in varying settings in the future 
favours cooperation, irrespective of the specifics of a proposal under negotiation. 
The incentive to take future settings into consideration is particularly high in federations 
where governments have to cooperate in dealing with day-to-day politics. When a government 
knows that they will meet with other governments several times in the future and that one day it 
may need the other's agreement to implement their own policies, making other governments 
inclined to cooperate in the future should be a very strong motivation to make concessions, 
provided that there is a realistic chance for reciprocity. Only actors who do not expect a positive 
‘tit for tat’ reaction because they anticipate being excluded from future decision-making will 
benefit more by dissenting strongly, thus focusing on image-building to attract votes while 
reinforcing their special status. 
The study indicates that, in general, actors are more willing to make sacrifices to benefit 
their negotiation partners than is usually expected (cf. Scharpf, 1997), even when there are no 
immediate package deals determining what they will get in return. This has strong long-term 
implications. Every decision made under similar conditions decreases the costs of the next one 
over a certain period of time. The effect lowers, ceteris paribus, the threshold at which future joint 
decisions become profitable (Silvestre, 1987; Lorenz & Seemann, 2009). Thus, cooperation 
routines have a certain effect. While, in principle, cooperation is always possible, the politico-
institutional context of negotiations and past interactions affect the probability or frequency of 
cooperation. As Michael Taylor puts it, the ‘egoism-altruism combination changes in a way which 
depends on the history of the players’ choices in previous games and on whether these choices 
were made voluntarily’ (Taylor, 1991: 176). 
Considering all these points, non-maximising individual benefits from constitutional 
amendments may be rational from the point of view of the collective actors, if the principle of 
rationality is not defined too narrowly as the maximisation of gains from every single decision. 
According to a wider concept of rationality, sequentially  
following different interaction orientations during constitutional negotiations can make sense for 
collective actors because it allows them to make flexible and fast decisions, to save decision costs 
and to maximise accumulated gains in the long run. From the collective actors’ point of view, the 
sequence of arguing and bargaining may be a way to reconcile the different logics of competition 
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and cooperation which are inherent in the political structure of modern democracies, especially in 
federal systems with many actors involved. 
From this reasoning, we may derive the following hypotheses to explain constitutional 
amendments: First, the more complex and dynamic the environment of the negotiations, the higher 
the probability that they are structured by a sequence of different interaction orientations of the 
participating actors. This is particularly true for federal systems. Second, the more the general 
politico-institutional context favours routines of cooperation among different actors, the higher the 
probability that the actors agree to an ordinary constitutional amendment without benefiting from 
its substance. This is particularly true for cooperative federalism and federal systems with many 
actors in parliament. 
Comparative studies on long-term collective decision-making will have to show if this 
reasoning holds true for many cases and various types of reforms (cf. Behnke et al. in this 
volume). In addition, the effects of the negotiation behaviour on the constitution and a federal 
system have to be analysed. Every amendment to a constitution which is rejected because of 
interests which do not refer to its substance, and every amendment which is adopted for reasons 
other than its substantive benefit for the common interest jeopardises the normative legitimacy of 
constitutions and their capacity to really bind parliaments and governments. In each of these cases, 
the sum of the choices of a higher number of actors may not protect against unilateral interest 
politics, as it is predicted by constitutionalist theory. One may question whether the partial 
consideration of systemic needs which is observable during the cooperative stage of negotiations 
may outweigh such a risk. Many critical notes on the coherence and problem-solving capacity of 
recent constitutional change in federal democracies remind us that the ability to win large 
majorities for amendments does not necessarily imply a special quality of these amendments. 
Cooperation is not a value in itself (Benz 2008, 2009). 
 
Conclusion 
This article has analysed constitutional negotiations in established democracies, based on an actor-
centred institutionalist approach. Starting from the observation that conventional negotiation 
studies fail to adequately explain constitutional amendments, it complements these studies by 
considering not only the interests of the relevant actors but also by their interaction orientation. 
Generalising findings of a comparative study on constitutional negotiations, the article confirmed 
that the effect of competing interests is not always the same. Moreover, asymmetric gains from 
cooperation are accepted. Interaction orientation has proved to be a dynamic element of the 
explanatory model. Three typical interaction orientations during the negotiation processes were 
identified which determine how actors negotiate, resulting in distinct conditions for agreement and 
generating a sequence of arguing and bargaining. 
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Given an individualistic interaction orientation, actors strive to follow the principle of ‘thin’ 
rational choice. While the agenda-setter is very important in determining the direction of the 
constitutional amendments, other actors agree to cooperate only if they are generally in favour of 
one or more of the agenda-setter's objectives, if they expect an additional benefit from a package 
deal and if the agenda-setter signals a willingness to compromise on certain aspects. Cooperative 
interaction orientation makes it easier to reach an agreement but does not automatically guarantee 
it. Favourable factors include translating political conflicts into organisational or legal conflicts, 
providing comprehensive information, insistently repeating key statements and giving other actors 
the feeling that they are taken seriously as negotiation partners. Given a competitive interaction 
orientation, the actors re-evaluate their cost-benefit situation and are influenced by contexts. But in 
contrast to the individualist interaction orientation, they evaluate the relative rather than the 
absolute benefit. 
The last section of the article proposed an overarching theoretical framework according to 
which the described pattern of negotiation behaviour may prove beneficial to the actors, 
particularly in federal systems. They facilitate flexible and fast action, reduce decision-making 
costs and allow actors to maximise the balance of present and future gains. The more complex and 
dynamic the environment of the negotiations, the higher the probability that they are structured by 
a sequence of different interaction orientations of the participating actors because this sequence, 
from the actors' point of view, may reconcile the antagonistic logics of competition and 
cooperation, particularly in federal systems with many actors. The more the general politico-
institutional structure favours routines of cooperation among different actors, the higher the 
probability that the actors agree to an ordinary constitutional amendment without benefiting from 
its substance. 
Future studies will have to discuss the long-term effects of such negotiation behaviour on the 
legitimacy and functionality of constitutions. The balance between competition among collective 
actors who pursue their own interests and cooperation in favour of the public interest, which 
constitutionalism should stabilise, is fragile. Political science should take any signs indicating a 
possible structural imbalance seriously. 
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